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Abstract
Whether a statistician wants to complement a probability model for observed
data with a prior distribution and carry out fully probabilistic inference, or
base the inference only on the likelihood function, may be a fundamental
question in theory, but in practice it may well be of less importance if the
likelihood contains much more information than the prior. Maximum likeli-
hood inference can be justified as a Gaussian approximation at the posterior
mode, using flat priors. However, in situations where parametric assumptions
in standard statistical models would be too rigid, more flexible model for-
mulation, combined with fully probabilistic inference, can be achieved using
hierarchical Bayesian parametrization. This work includes five articles, all of
which apply probability modeling under various problems involving incom-
plete observation. Three of the papers apply maximum likelihood estimation
and two of them hierarchical Bayesian modeling.
Because maximum likelihood may be presented as a special case of Bayes-
ian inference, but not the other way round, in the introductory part of
this work we present a framework for probability-based inference using only
Bayesian concepts. We also re-derive some results presented in the origi-
nal articles using the toolbox equipped herein, to show that they are also
justifiable under this more general framework. Here the assumption of ex-
changeability and de Finetti’s representation theorem are applied repeatedly
for justifying the use of standard parametric probability models with con-
ditionally independent likelihood contributions. It is argued that this same
reasoning can be applied also under sampling from a finite population.
The main emphasis here is in probability-based inference under incom-
plete observation due to study design. This is illustrated using a generic
two-phase cohort sampling design as an example. The alternative approaches
presented for analysis of such a design are full likelihood, which utilizes all
observed information, and conditional likelihood, which is restricted to a
completely observed set, conditioning on the rule that generated that set.
Conditional likelihood inference is also applied for a joint analysis of preva-
lence and incidence data, a situation subject to both left censoring and left
truncation. Other topics covered are model uncertainty and causal infer-
ence using posterior predictive distributions. We formulate a non-parametric
monotonic regression model for one or more covariates and a Bayesian esti-
mation procedure, and apply the model in the context of optimal sequential
treatment regimes, demonstrating that inference based on posterior predic-
tive distributions is feasible also in this case.
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1 Introduction
Two objectives guide this presentation. First, statistics without a theoretical
framework would be but a collection of unrelated tricks (Cox, 2006). Accept-
ing without reservations the need for a framework, the second goal here is to
present it in the most minimalist way possible. According to Dawid (1984),
“the only concept needed to express uncertainty is probability”. A corollary
of this is that, inasmuch statistical inference is about making informed state-
ments on unobserved quantities, we can present a theoretical framework for
statistical inference using probability as the only concept.
Although the articles included in this work involve a variety of statisti-
cal inference problems, what is common to all five papers is that they all
apply probability models as the tool for solving the problems. Whether the
actual estimation of the parameters of the probability models is carried out
using maximum likelihood methods or Bayesian computation is of less im-
portance in some of these problems. However, there are compelling reasons
for choosing the Bayesian approach as the theoretical framework for the pre-
sentation herein. First, maximum likelihood inference may be presented as
a special case or approximation of fully probabilistic Bayesian inference (see
Section 3.2), while the opposite is not possible. For instance, many problems
involving hierarchical parametrization involve adoption of the Bayesian ap-
proach. Even though under certain conditions (see exchangeability below)
frequency-based reasoning will, in the limit, produce results similar to the
Bayesian approach, generally the frequency-based concept of probability is
too limited to cover all statistical inference problems. (As a side note, the
properties of Bayesian computation are evaluated using frequency-based rea-
soning, see Bayarri and Berger, 2004, p. 64 and Section 3.1.) Thus, due to
the stated striving for a minimalist presentation, we will avoid presenting two
theoretical frameworks side by side by choosing to present only the more gen-
eral one. Moreover, the theoretical toolbox needed for the Bayesian approach
is considerably lighter compared to the alternatives. Since the uncertainty
on all kinds of unobserved quantities may be expressed using conditional
(posterior) probability distributions given the observed quantities (data), we
only need to know the Bayes’ theorem (Section 2.2) to be able to express
the posterior distribution as a function of the probability model for the data
(the likelihood) and our prior information on the unobserved quantities. Ap-
plying the Bayes’ theorem is essentially updating prior knowledge based on
new observed information. Due to the adoption of the Bayesian approach in
this presentation, we will also re-derive some results presented in the original
articles using the toolbox equipped herein.
According to Lindley and Novick (1981, p. 45), “inference is a process
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whereby one passes from data on a set of units to statements about a further
unit”. Though not all statistical inference problems involve the concept of
a population consisting of units or individuals, the epidemiological applica-
tions considered in the five articles herein do. Thus in addition to conditional
probability, we need to know how to utilize observations made on different in-
dividuals to make inference on quantities interpreted to represent something
that is a property of a population of individuals (or a generic individual,
that is, the further unit in the above quote). For this purpose, we utilize
the concept of exchangeability and the related result known as de Finetti’s
theorem (Section 2.2). The exchangeability postulate means that the units
or individuals can be exchanged in such a way that the joint information
learned when observing some characteristic on a finite set of such units does
not depend on which observation was made on which unit. This is usually ex-
panded by assuming always a further unit (and the resulting infinite sequence
of further units) onto which the same property applies. Now the similarity
of the units implied by their exchangeability can be put to use in statistical
inference by applying de Finetti’s representation theorem which states that
the joint distribution of observations made on a finite set of such units can be
represented in terms of a prior distribution for parameters and a parametric
probability model where the individual contributions are conditionally inde-
pendent given the parameters. This justifies the use of conventional i.i.d.
models, even though in terms of information learned, observations are not
independent (Rubin, 1987, p. 40). It should be noted that without the exten-
sion of exchangeability onto infinite sequences, the representation theorem
holds only approximately (Diaconis, 1977; Diaconis and Freedman, 1980).
In the following we apply the representation theorem only for introducing
parameters which we can interpret to be properties of a generic unit (or any
population of such units; what this means in the case of sampling from a
finite population is discussed in Section 4.2). We do not apply it for quan-
tities which are properties of study designs such as inclusion indicators in
finite population sampling or treatment assignments in an experimental de-
sign, which cannot be naturally extended outside some finite context. This
does not imply that fully probabilistic Bayesian inference would be invalid in
situations where the exchangeability does not hold; only that the resulting
probability expressions will likely be more complicated.
The plan is as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic concepts of axiomatic
(measure theoretical) system of probability and briefly discusses the informa-
tion based interpretation of probability. These concepts are then applied in
the context of statistical inference, with a review of conditional probability,
conditional expectation, Bayes’ theorem, exchangeability and de Finetti’s
theorem. Predictive inference, a natural extension of the exchangeability
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postulate, is also discussed. As examples of probability models, we review
marked point processes, and a special case of these, survival models. Section
3 discusses Bayesian computation, and as an alternative, maximum likeli-
hood estimation. Section 4 introduces the topics covered in the five articles,
presenting these under the umbrella term of incomplete observation, using
this term in a slightly wider meaning than, for instance, Andersen et al.
(1993, Chapter III). We argue that from the Bayesian point of view, we do
not need to make a conceptual distinction between unobserved observables
and unobservables, since the inference on both kinds of quantities proceeds in
exactly the same way. The main topic covered here is the missing by design
situation, using a generic two-phase study design as an example, and the
alternative approaches of full likelihood, which utilizes all observed informa-
tion, and conditional likelihood, which is restricted to completely observed
set, conditioning on the rule that generated that set. In addition, we in-
troduce the topics of model uncertainty and causal inference using posterior
predictive distributions. We summarize the conclusions in Section 5.
2 Probability-based statistical inference
2.1 Probability
A. N. Kolmogorov’s (1933) mathematical (axiomatic) definition of proba-
bility is straightforward, although it says little on the philosophical essence
of probability and randomness. A collection of subsets of the sample space
Ω, closed with respect to countable set operations, is known as a σ-algebra.
We denote this as F . The pair (Ω,F) is a measurable space, where events
A ∈ F are said to be measurable sets. A probability measure is a map-
ping P : F → [0, 1], for which P (Ω) = 1 and P (
⋃∞
i=1Ai) =
∑∞
i=1 P (Ai)
for disjoint sets Ai ∈ F . The triple (Ω,F , P ) is called a probability space.
Commonly in applications the events A ∈ F can not be observed directly
and the probability space represents merely an abstraction of the random
phenomenon of interest. A random variable maps the outcomes ω ∈ Ω onto
outcomes on some observable space. A real valued (F -measurable) random
variable is defined as X : Ω→ R, for which X−1(B) ∈ F for all B ∈ B, where
B is the Borel σ-algebra of R. (Some examples of non-real valued random
variables are introduced in Sections 2.4 and 4.6.) The combined mapping
PX ≡ P ◦ X−1 is called the distribution of X. It is a probability measure
on the measurable space (R,B). Random variable X is said to be continu-
ous if its distribution is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure l. Then the distribution can be written as PX(B) =
∫
B
fX(x) l(dx)
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for all B ∈ B, where fX : R → R+ is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of PX
with respect to l, and is known as the density function of X. The cumu-
lative distribution function FX(x) ≡ PX((−∞, x]) uniquely determines the
distribution of X. A random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xp) : Ω→ Rp can be de-
fined analogously to above. Then the (joint) distribution PX is a probability
measure on (Rp,Bp), where Bp is the Borel σ-algebra of Rp.
With the above mathematical concepts reiterated, we are left with the
question of what are probability and randomness. Here we take the view that
uncertainty is essentially lack of information on physically existing quantities
and deterministic (causal) events occurring in our single material universe.
This corresponds most closely to the “support” (or evidence) interpretation
of probability (Shafer, 1992), and differs from the “belief” (or subjective)
interpretation mainly in that in the former case the degree of belief is what
a (generic) rational individual would hold given specific degree of evidence,
while in the latter case the degree of belief may be different even between
individuals holding the same information. What evidence, or information,
means in terms of probabilities comes clearer in Section 2.2 with the dis-
cussion on conditional probabilities. Shafer (1992) calls the support inter-
pretation of probability as “rational degree of belief” while Cox (2006) uses
the term “impersonal degree of belief”. The support interpretation could be
brought closer to subjective interpretation by considering also individuals’
other properties as “information” which affects their decisions. Thus there
does not need to be a contradiction between objective reality and subjective
probability. Consistent with the support interpretation would be to think
that in the case of complete information there is no randomness. Naturally,
this brings us to the controversies of quantum mechanics. However, with a
reference to Jaynes (2003, p. 327-330), we shall proceed with the assumption
that the events of interest are sufficiently macro-level for such questions to be
less relevant. To sum up, we assume the existence of a single reality, mecha-
nistic in nature; our objective is to collect more information on that reality,
and to attempt to quantify how much is still unknown given this information.
2.2 Bayes’ and de Finetti’s theorems
As noted before, the objective in statistical inference is to make informed
statements on unobserved quantities based on observed data. A very gen-
eral tool for this purpose discussed here is the probability model. A para-
metric probability model is a probability distribution specified in terms of
parameters, which may be broadly interpreted to represent some underlying
properties of a mechanism which has produced the observations, hopefully
capturing some systematic components of interest (e.g. Cox and Hinkley,
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1974, p. 5). A more concrete interpretation of parameters, which we will
adopt for this presentation, is discussed below. It is usually not contended
that such a model is an accurate representation of reality, nor is such accu-
racy necessary. What is important is that the model is able to capture some
essential characteristics of reality and simplify them into a manageable form
(cf. Cox and Hinkley, 1974, p. 5-6).
Let now Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) : Ω → Rn and Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θp) : Ω → Rp
both be (F -measurable) random vectors. Here Y represents observations
while Θ represents parameters. That the parameters are taken to be ran-
dom variables on the same σ-algebra as the random variables representing
observable quantities, already implies that the present approach is Bayesian.
Despite its name, this particular school of thought is attributable to Bruno
de Finetti (1906-1985) rather than Thomas Bayes (c. 1702-1761) (Jaynes,
2003, p. 655; see also de Finetti, 1974, and Stigler, 1982). The Bayesian
approach will be chosen throughout, as it considerably simplifies the theo-
retical framework needed for making statistical inference (Cox and Hinkley,
1974, p. 364; Efron, 1978, p. 236). In fact, the only results needed in ad-
dition to the basic probability theory are the two named in the title of the
present section. Since the objective was to make inference about param-
eters Θ based on observations, a natural starting point is the conditional
expectation E(g(Θ) | Y ) ≡ E(g(Θ) | σ(Y )), where σ(Y ) ⊂ F is the sub-
σ-algebra induced by the random vector Y (that is, the smallest σ-algebra
with respect to which Y is measurable) and g : Rp → R is some Borel-
measurable function. In decision theoretic framework g would be a loss
function, but we do not consider formal decision making here; a decision
theoretic approach to statistical inference is presented by e.g. Young and
Smith (2005). The latter representation of the conditional expectation is
central to its interpretation, since σ-algebras can be interpreted as informa-
tion; the larger σ(Y ) is, the more information it can potentially convey on
Θ. On the other hand, if Y involves no information, that is, σ(Y ) = {Ω, ∅},
then E(g(Θ) | {Ω, ∅}) = E(g(Θ)), the unconditional expectation. It is also
worth recalling here the definition of independence; random vectors Θ and
Y are independent (denoted as Θ ⊥ Y ) if P (A1 ∩A2) = P (A1)P (A2) for all
A1 ∈ σ(Θ) and A2 ∈ σ(Y ), or equivalently, in terms of conditional probabil-
ities, P (A1 | A2) = P (A1). The relationship between conditional probability
and conditional expectation is P (A1 | A2) = E(1A1 | A2), where 1A1 de-
notes the indicator function of event A1. The interpretation of independence
between the random variables Θ and Y is that Y involves no information
relevant to learning on Θ (Dawid, 1979, p. 3). Independence can be defined
equivalently in terms of probability distributions: Θ ⊥ Y if the joint dis-
tribution of the concatenated random vector (Θ, Y ) has the product form
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PΘ,Y (Θ ∈ B1, Y ∈ B2) = PΘ(Θ ∈ B1)PY (Y ∈ B2) for all B1 ∈ Bp and
B2 ∈ Bn.
In practice we are interested in the conditional expectation given a single
observed realization Y = y. This can be calculated using the formula
E(g(Θ) | Y = y) =
∫
θ∈Rp
g(θ)PΘ|Y (Θ ∈ dθ | Y = y). (1)
Here PΘ|Y is the (regular) conditional distribution of Θ given Y . This is more
commonly known as the posterior distribution and is the basis of Bayesian
inference. It is the representation of the uncertainty on the unknown param-
eters Θ after learning the information in the observed data y. The functional
form of this distribution is usually not known directly, but rather is given in
terms of other probability distributions by the Bayes’ theorem
PΘ|Y (Θ ∈ dθ | Y = y) =
PΘ,Y (Θ ∈ dθ, Y ∈ dy)
PY (Y ∈ dy)
=
PY |Θ(Y ∈ dy | Θ = θ)PΘ(Θ ∈ dθ)∫
θ∈Rp
PY |Θ(Y ∈ dy | Θ = θ)PΘ(Θ ∈ dθ)
. (2)
This formula is attributed to Bayes (1763), though Stigler’s law of eponymy
has been raised here by Stigler (1983). Here the distributions PY |Θ and PΘ
are known as the likelihood and the prior, respectively. Together they define
the probability model for the phenomenon of interest.
Often the observations are made on several units or subjects judged to
be in some sense “similar”, and the interest lies in the common traits of
such units. Model formulation in such cases can be justified by introducing
the concept of exchangeability, which defines the required similarity, and its
consequence, de Finetti’s theorem, which introduces the common traits (pa-
rameters). The random vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) is said to be exchangeable
if the joint distribution PY is the same for every permutation of the indices
{1, . . . , n} (Kingman, 1978). This can be interpreted to mean for example
that the order in which the observations were collected is not informative
(Bernardo, 1996) or in an epidemiological context, if exposure states of indi-
viduals would be exchanged, the joint distribution of outcomes would be un-
changed (Greenland and Robins, 1986). If exchangeability holds for infinite
sequences of such random variables, the representation theorem of de Finetti
(1937) states that there exists a random vector Θ with a distribution PΘ so
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that
PY (Y ∈ dy) =
∫
θ∈Rp
PY |Θ(Y ∈ dy | Θ = θ)PΘ(Θ ∈ dθ)
=
∫
θ∈Rp
[
n∏
i=1
PYi|Θ(Yi ∈ dyi | Θ = θ)
]
PΘ(Θ ∈ dθ). (3)
For a proof, see Kingman (1978). It should first be noted that this result
makes possible a purely functional definition for parameters, that is, param-
eters are that random vector for which (3) holds true. However, the theorem
merely states the existence of the distributions PYi|Θ and PΘ, rather than
specifying them (Bernardo, 1996). Thus further assumptions are needed in
the actual model specification. Even if the result may not hold exactly when
standard statistical models are substituted for these distributions, they may
still serve as approximations. Thus the use of i.i.d. models in Bayesian in-
ference can be justified by (3), with the parameters interpreted accordingly
(Diaconis, 1977, p. 271, Rubin, 1987, p. 40). In the following we will in-
troduce and interpret the model parameters according to the representation
theorem.
The somewhat tricky concept of exchangeability is best illustrated with
an example. It is said that an elephant is difficult to define but you know
one when you see it. Now suppose that an observer has never seen an ele-
phant before. However, after seeing one elephant, the observer should have
a reasonably good idea how the next one will look like. In terms of random
variables this means that the two observations clearly are not independent.
However, it seems reasonable to assume that they are exchangeable, so that
the joint information learned on elephants based on two observations does
not depend on which one of the two elephants was seen first. Further, sup-
pose that the observer identifies traits that are common to all of the observed
elephants such as that they are large, gray and have trunks and tusks. With
enough such traits identified, it is likely that the observer can no longer
identify further ones. The observer can predict that the next elephant will
have these features, but it will also have some unique features that are dif-
ferent from the previous observations. This means that given the identified
traits (characteristic features, i.e., parameters of elephant), the observations
are independent. This conditional independence property corresponds to the
product form of the likelihood distribution in (3). It applies when the model
is accurate in the sense that the parameters adequately describe the “form”
or “idea” of elephant, or in less abstract terms, the features of any population
of similar (exchangeable) elephants.
It is instructive to consider also situations where exchangeability does
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not necessarily hold by elaborating the example. Now suppose the sequence
of observations consists of elephants and mammoths. Considering these as
fully exchangeable does no longer seem reasonable; an observed characteristic
might have a different meaning depending on whether it was observed for an
elephant or a mammoth (say, observing one hairy mammoth and one hairless
elephant does not give the same information as observing a hairy elephant and
a hairless mammoth). When trying to understand this in terms of probability
expressions it is useful to note that permuting the indices of the random
variables is equivalent to permuting their realized values. Suppose that now
n = 2 and Yi ∈ {0, 1}, corresponding to absence/presence of some trait
common to mammoths but rare in elephants. Now if the first observation
i = 1 happens to be an elephant and i = 2 a mammoth, it seems obvious
that, for instance, P (Y1 = 0, Y2 = 1) 6= P (Y1 = 1, Y2 = 0), and we do not
have exchangeability. Let the random vector X = (X1, . . . , Xn) : Ω → Rn
indicate the subpopulation membership of observations {1, . . . , n} and Y =
(Y1, . . . , Yn) the measured characteristic. In the present example with n = 2
and Xi ∈ {0, 1} (elephant/mammoth), it easy to see that the exchangeability
does not hold because the information on the subpopulation is implicitly
included in the indices of the observations. The lesson to be learned from here
is that the exchangeability postulate may be questionable when the random
variables are doubly stochastic so that the indices of the observations are also
random variables, the realized values of which contain information relevant
to the problem. This issue is re-encountered in Section 4.3.
The previous discussion suggests that all observed information must be
explicitly stated in the probability expression. It is now indeed more rea-
sonable to assume that the joint distribution PX,Y is exchangeable in unit
indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, in which case the likelihood factors into a product
form over the individual contributions PXi,Yi|Θ (Rubin, 1987, p. 40). In the
ongoing example we would then have
P (X1 = 0, Y1 = 0, X2 = 1, Y2 = 1) = P (X1 = 1, Y1 = 1, X2 = 0, Y2 = 0),
that is, the indices are no longer informative, and relabeling the observations
does not change the joint probability. However, now it follows that
P (X1 = 0, Y1 = 0, X2 = 0, Y2 = 1) + P (X1 = 0, Y1 = 0, X2 = 1, Y2 = 1)
+ P (X1 = 1, Y1 = 0, X2 = 0, Y2 = 1) + P (X1 = 1, Y1 = 0, X2 = 1, Y2 = 1)
= P (X1 = 0, Y1 = 1, X2 = 0, Y2 = 0) + P (X1 = 1, Y1 = 1, X2 = 0, Y2 = 0)
+ P (X1 = 0, Y1 = 1, X2 = 1, Y2 = 0) + P (X1 = 1, Y1 = 1, X2 = 1, Y2 = 0),
that is, P (Y1 = 0, Y2 = 1) = P (Y1 = 1, Y2 = 0) = P (Y2 = 0, Y1 = 1), meaning
that exchangeability in the marginal distribution follows from exchangeabil-
ity in the joint distribution. While this may appear to be in conflict with
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the earlier notion of no exchangeability in the marginal distribution of the
observed traits, the marginalization here has to be interpreted as losing the
information on the subpopulation membership. In contrast, if the observer
possesses this information, it has to be included in the joint probability state-
ment to achieve exchangeability.
Alternative approach would be to assume that the exchangeability applies
within sequences of observations and between the indices of the sequences.
Continuing the example, the model would be then parameterized in terms
of traits which are common to both elephants and mammoths and traits
which are specific to the two species. This idea corresponds to hierarchical
Bayesian parametrization; by introducing parameter vectors Θk : Ω → Rp,
k = 1, . . . , m, corresponding to m subpopulations and a vector of hyper-
parameters Φ : Ω → Rq, de Finetti’s theorem is then applied both within
subpopulations and between subpopulation indices as (Bernardo, 1996)
PY (Y ∈ dy) =
∫
θ∈Rmp
[
m∏
k=1
nk∏
i=1
PYki|Θk(Yki ∈ dyki | Θk = θk)
]
PΘ(Θ ∈ dθ),
where nk is the number of observations from the subpopulation k, Y =
(Y1, . . . , Ym) : Ω→ R
n1+...+nm, Θ = (Θ1, . . . ,Θm) : Ω→ R
mp and
PΘ(Θ ∈ dθ) =
∫
φ∈Rq
[
m∏
k=1
PΘk|Φ(Θk ∈ dθk | Φ = φ)
]
PΦ(Φ ∈ dφ).
2.3 Predictive inference
In the previous section the main interest was in the model parameters, but
an alternative approach would be to base the inference entirely upon ob-
servable quantities, by considering probability distributions of future events
given past observations (Dawid, 1984). When more observations are being
accumulated, the predictions become progressively more accurate. Predic-
tive inference has direct applications in, for example, clinical decision mak-
ing, even if the causal relationships between the factors involved would not
be fully understood. Now suppose we have observed a realization of the
random vector Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) and want to predict the next observation,
represented by the random variable Yn+1 : Ω→ R. The relevant probability
distribution for this problem is the (posterior) predictive distribution
PYn+1|Y (Yn+1 ∈ dyn+1 | Y = y)
=
∫
θ∈Rp
PYn+1|Θ(Yn+1 ∈ dyn+1 | Θ = θ)PΘ|Y (Θ ∈ dθ | Y = y). (4)
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The parametric probability model corresponding to the posterior distribution
PΘ|Y is reintroduced here for the purpose of translating the information in the
past observations into information on the future observation. Following the
previously introduced exchangeability reasoning, there exists a parametric
probability distribution so that, given the parameters, the future observation
Yn+1 is conditionally independent of Y , with the parameters involving all
information relevant to the prediction.
It is at this point worthwhile to consider the difference between explana-
tion (i.e., theory building or verification) and prediction tasks. According to
the widely (though not universally) accepted principle of Occam’s razor, the
explanation should be as parsimonious as possible, that is, involving as lit-
tle hypothetical quantities as possible (but no fewer than that). This means
that if two theories are able to explain the same observations, the more parsi-
monious theory should be preferred. In statistical modeling the requirement
for parsimony is self-evident, as the model fit can be progressively increased
by adding more parameters. Now in terms of the marginal distribution of
the data, PY (Y ∈ dy), the probability of observing any given realization y
depends on two opposite effects of model complexity. A model with more
parameters allows better fit to data, but on the other hand can accommodate
a wider range of observations. This in turn means that the more complex
model is more difficult to falsify with new observations (Jefferys and Berger,
1992). Further, the predictive accuracy of overly complex model suffers due
to the added noise. Bayesian model selection is further discussed in Section
4.6; it is based on maximizing the marginal probability of the data and thus
involves an inbuilt penalty for model complexity, functioning as an “auto-
matic Occam’s razor” (Smith and Spiegelhalter, 1980). Since the requirement
for parsimony is present in both explanation and prediction tasks, the main
difference between these is that the parameters of a prediction model are
integrated out of the predictive distribution (4) and thus do not play a part
in the actual inference. In contrast, parameters in an explanatory model
would usually have some hypothesized real life counterparts, which would be
the main target of the inference. This distinction has consequences to the
selection of the best model; in the prediction task this is in principle straight-
forward: “the best model is the one which best predicts the fate of a future
subject” (Clayton and Hills, 1993, p. 271). Prediction model may be vali-
dated by comparing the predictions to true outcomes. In contrast, choosing
the best explanation model is a more ambiguous task; marginal probability
of the data is only one of the various criteria suggested for this.
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2.4 Survival models and marked point processes
The Articles I-III deal with modeling of censored time-to-event data, so as
an example of probability models we recall here the basic concepts of (para-
metric) survival modeling. In the following, we compress the notation in-
troduced in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 by denoting all probability distributions
by P , with the argument indicating which distribution is in question. Also,
we do not distinguish between random variables and their realized values
if this is clear from the context. We are now concerned with pairs of ran-
dom variables (Ti, Ei), i = 1, . . . , n, where each Ti ≥ 0 represents an event
time and Ei ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J} indicates the type of the event at Ti. Here
Ei = 0 indicates censoring, that is, end of the observation of subject i for
reasons other than occurrence of any of the events of interest. Since the
observations are accumulated progressively over time, it is useful to con-
sider the situation in terms of stochastic processes, that is, sets of random
variables indexed with respect to time. The events are identified by count-
ing processes Nij(t) = 1{Ti≤t,Ei=j}, j = 0, 1, . . . , J . In addition, Zi(t) de-
notes a covariate process for subject i. Consistently with the previously
discussed interpretation of σ-algebras as information, we can define the his-
tory Ft− = σ({Nij(u), Zi(u) : i = 1, . . . , n; j = 0, 1, . . . , J ; 0 ≤ u < t}), which
represents the observed information up to but not including time point t.
More information is accumulated as time passes, meaning that the sequence
of histories is increasing in time, that is, Fu− ⊆ Ft− for u ≤ t. Using these
quantities, and assuming Ti to be continuous, we can characterize cause-
specific hazard (or intensity) functions λij(t) as
P (Ti ∈ dt, Ei = j | Ft−) = P (Nij(dt) = 1 | Ft−)
= E(Nij(dt) | Ft−) = λij(t) dt.
The above corresponds to the problem of predicting whether an event of type
j is going to occur for subject i at time Ti ∈ dt, based on everything known
until just before t. Consequently, the hazard function for any type of event
occurring is
λi(t) dt = P (Ti ∈ dt | Ft−) = P (Ni(dt) = 1 | Ft−) = E(Ni(dt) | Ft−),
where λi(t) =
∑J
j=0 λij(t) and Ni(t) =
∑J
j=0Nij(t) (Arjas, 1989, p. 184-185).
It should be noted that the additivity of hazards applies always when the
event definitions are mutually exclusive and does not imply independence
between the different event types.
Parametric survival models can now be defined in terms of hazard func-
tions. For simplicity we take the covariates to be constant over time, with
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the realized value Zi = zi treated as fixed, and assume the current state of
each individual to be conditionally independent of other individuals’ histo-
ries, given the individual’s own history and a vector of parameters Θ = θ. It
should be noted that this assumption would not be valid, for example, in the
context of contagious diseases (Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 2002, p. 152). The
cause-specific hazard function now simplifies into
λij(t) dt = P (Ti ∈ dt, Ei = j | Ti ≥ t, zi, θ). (5)
The (sub)distribution of the events of type j is given by (Kalbfleisch and
Prentice, 2002, p. 251-252)
P (Ti ∈ dt, Ei = j | zi, θ) = P (Ti ∈ dt, Ei = j | Ti ≥ t, zi, θ)P (Ti ≥ t | zi, θ)
= λij(t) dt exp
{
−
∫ t
0
J∑
k=0
λik(u) du
}
.
The above holds true without any further assumptions on the parametriza-
tion of the model. However, suppose that the parameter vector is parti-
tioned as Θ = (Θ0,Θ1, . . . ,ΘJ), where Θj , j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , J} are parame-
ters describing specifically events of type j. Typically some of the Θj are
not of interest (are nuisance parameters); most commonly this is the case
for Θ0, the parameters describing the censoring events. It would be desir-
able to avoid specification of the model components which are not of in-
terest. This is possible if in (5) we could assume conditional independence
(Ti ∈ dt, Ei = j) ⊥ Θ−j | Ti ≥ t, zi, θj , where Θ−j ≡ {Θ0,Θ1, . . . ,Θp}\{Θj}.
Now (5) may be parameterized in terms of θj only and the subdistribution
becomes
P (Ti ∈ dt, Ei = j | zi, θ)
θj
∝ λij(t) exp
{
−
∫ t
0
λij(u) du
}
.
However, the required conditional independence assumption stated above is
untestable in practice (Arjas, 1989, p. 204-205). What actually is assumed
here is best illustrated with an example. Suppose an experiment where two
(different kinds of) components are connected in series in an electrical circuit.
Now J = 1, with parameters Θ0 and Θ1 describing the properties of the
two component types, including their expected lifetime. Covariates zi might
include the properties of the experimental set-up other than those of the two
components, such as the current running through the circuit. If the interest
is in making inference on, say, the expected lifetime of the components of
type 1, failure of the component of type 0 censors the observation on the
other component. However, given that zi involves all relevant attributes
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of the experiment, it may be reasonable to assume such censoring to be
noninformative (or non-innovative, Arjas, 1989, p. 204), that is, that it does
not depend on the properties of the components of type 1, characterized by
the parameters Θ1. For observations from n repeats of such an experiment,
we can now write a likelihood expression
n∏
i=1
P (Ti ∈ dti, Ei = ei | zi, θ)
θ1
∝
n∏
i=1
[
λi1(ti)
ei exp
{
−
∫ ti
0
λi1(u) du
}]
.
In both of the parameter estimation methods to be discussed in Sections 3.1
and 3.2 it is sufficient to define the likelihood function only up to a constant.
With an additional requirement that the random vectors Θ0 and Θ1 are a pri-
ori independent, this means that if the parameters Θ0 are not of interest, they
need not be estimated (Rubin, 1976). Technically, a priori independence of
parameter vectors is defined as in Section 2.2. However, since the parameters
are unobservable quantities, the practical interpretation of this assumption
may be difficult to grasp at first. In the previous example this could mean
that if the two components originated from different manufacturers and fac-
tories, even if we had some prior information on the expected lifetime or other
properties of such components in general, we do not have a reason to believe
that the manufacturing processes of the two factories would be similar in such
a way that the properties of the produced components would be more similar
than indicated by the marginal prior distributions. A priori independence
of parameters can be best understood as conditional independence given the
prior information, even if such conditioning is not always explicitly written.
In Articles IV and V the underlying model structure is defined in terms of
marked point processes, which, in addition to being models for spatial phe-
nomena, are a flexible tool for constructing probability models with less rigid
parametric assumptions (see e.g. Arjas and Heikkinen, 1997). In one dimen-
sion, survival models can be presented as a special case of the marked point
process framework (Arjas, 1989). The following definition is from Møller and
Waagepetersen (2004, p. 241-242), and is taken up here as an example of
non-real valued random variables. Let S ⊆ Rp. Further, let B ∈ B0 : B ⊆ S,
where B0 is the class of bounded Borel sets. Point configurations x ⊆ S are
locally finite if n(xB) <∞, where xB = x∩B. The space of all locally finite
point configurations is defined as Nlf = {x ⊆ S : n(xB) < ∞∀B ∈ B0}.
The σ-algebra induced by such sets is Nlf = σ({x ∈ Nlf : n(xB) = m} :
B ∈ B0, m ∈ N0). A point process is an (F -measurable) random variable
X : Ω → Nlf, for which X−1(F ) ∈ F for all F ∈ Nlf. Its distribution PX
is a probability measure on (Nlf,Nlf) and its realizations are locally finite
point configurations x = (x1, . . . , xn(x)), where xj ∈ S, j = 1, . . . , n(x). A
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marked point process Y (with mark space A ⊆ R) is obtained by attaching
a random variable (mark) Ej : Ω → A to each point Tj ∈ S of a point pro-
cess X: Y = {(Tj , Ej) : Tj ∈ X} ⊂ S × A. The connection to the earlier
time-to-event data situation is obvious from this notation; if S = [0,∞), the
point locations can be interpreted as event times, and marks indicate what
happens at each event time, that is, type of the event or censoring.
A building block for more complicated point processes is often the Pois-
son point process. Let ρ : S → [0,∞) be an intensity function and µ(B) =∫
B
ρ(xj) dxj an intensity measure. The distribution for a Poisson point pro-
cess on S with intensity function ρ can be written for any B ⊆ S : µ(B) <∞
and F ⊆ Nlf as (Møller and Waagepetersen, 2004, p. 15)
P (XB ∈ F ) =
∞∑
n=0
P (XB ∈ F | n)P (N(B) = n)
=
∞∑
n=0
∫
x1∈B
. . .
∫
xn∈B
1{(x1,...,xn)∈F}
[
n∏
j=1
ρ(xj)
µ(B)
dxj
]
µ(B)n
n!
exp{−µ(B)}
=
∞∑
n=0
exp{−µ(B)}
n!
∫
x1∈B
. . .
∫
xn∈B
1{(x1,...,xn)∈F}
[
n∏
j=1
ρ(xj) dxj
]
. (6)
Here the (random) number of points N(B) is Poisson distributed with mean
µ(B) and the point configuration given the number of points consists of inde-
pendent and identically distributed points with density f(xj) = ρ(xj)/µ(B)
(this is known as a binomial point process). The above distribution is fully
defined by the intensity function. If ρ is constant, the process is called a
homogeneous Poisson process.
3 Estimation
3.1 Markov chain Monte Carlo
Formula (1) already suggested how Bayesian inference on parameters Θ :
Ω → Rp might be carried out. A closed form for the posterior distribu-
tion can be obtained only in special cases where the likelihood and the prior
are conjugate so that application of Bayes’ formula gives a posterior distri-
bution of similar form as the prior, with “updated” parameter values. In
the general case the inference utilizes simulation. The term “Monte Carlo
method” was coined by Metropolis and Ulam (1949) and refers to a family
of computational methods where simulations based on computer generated
random numbers are used to find approximate solutions to mathematical
21
problems. In Monte Carlo integration the integral of the type (1) is approx-
imated by gm =
1
m
∑m
k=1 g
(
θ(k)
)
, where
(
θ(1), . . . , θ(m)
)
is an independent
random sample from the posterior distribution PΘ|Y . By the strong law of
large numbers, now gm
a.s.
→ E(g(Θ) | Y = y) when m → ∞ (Robert and
Casella, 2004, p. 83). If the functional form of PΘ|Y is unknown, drawing
independent random samples from it is not straightforward either. Fortu-
nately, the above convergence still holds true if the sample is obtained from
a Markov chain with stationary distribution PΘ|Y . A Markov chain is a se-
quence of random variables Θ(0),Θ(1),Θ(2), . . . which, for any k ∈ N, has the
conditional independence property Θ(k+1) ⊥
(
Θ(0),Θ(1), . . . ,Θ(k−1)
)
| Θ(k).
The probability of a state transition in a Markov chain is often denoted as
K(θ, A) =
∫
θ′∈A
K(θ, dθ′) = PΘ(k+1)|Θ(k)
(
Θ(k+1) ∈ A | Θ(k) = θ
)
, where K is
known as a transition kernel. The transition kernel and the resulting chain
are here taken to be time-homogeneous (stationary), meaning that the su-
perscript can be dropped from the notation. A sufficient condition for the
chain to have the target stationary distribution PΘ|Y is that the transition
kernel satisfies
PΘ|Y (Θ ∈ A | Y = y) =
∫
θ∈Rp
K(θ, A)PΘ|Y (Θ ∈ dθ | Y = y) (7)
for all A ∈ Bp. A well behaving Markov chain should also be irreducible,
recurrent and aperiodic. Omitting formal definitions, these three properties
mean that the chain moves (communicates) between all states A ∈ Bp, that
each state is visited often enough, and that the moves are not deterministic
in nature.
There are a variety of methods for constructing a Markov chain fulfilling
(7); we will review here one which is widely used in applications, known
as “Metropolized Gibbs sampler” or “Metropolis-within-Gibbs” (Robert and
Casella, 2004, p. 392-394). First, the transition kernel is chosen as
K(θ, dθ′) = PΘ1|Θ−1,Y (Θ1 ∈ dθ
′
1 | θ2, . . . , θp, y)
× PΘ2|Θ−2,Y (Θ2 ∈ dθ
′
2 | θ
′
1, θ3, . . . , θp, y)
× . . .× PΘp|Θ−p,Y (Θp ∈ dθ
′
p | θ
′
1, . . . , θ
′
p−1, y),
where Θ−j ≡ {Θ1, . . . ,Θp} \ {Θj}. This corresponds to updating each of the
components Θj, j = 1, . . . , p, in turn from their univariate full conditional
distributions. This algorithm is known as the Gibbs sampler. The name
was introduced by Geman and Geman (1984), who devised the algorithm
for sampling from Gibbs distributions, a very general distribution family.
Despite being nondescriptive, the name has stuck (Banerjee et al., 2004, p.
113). A result known as the Hammersley-Clifford theorem states that the
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joint distribution can always be expressed as a function of the set of full con-
ditional distributions, which thus contain sufficient information for sampling
from the joint distribution (e.g. Robert and Casella, 2004, p. 377). As a side
note, the converse is not true, that is, a set of full conditional distributions
does not necessarily define any joint distribution. Now, each of the sub-
chains Θ
(0)
j ,Θ
(1)
j ,Θ
(2)
j , . . . is also a Markov chain. Using shorthand notations
θ′1:(j−1) ≡ (θ
′
1, θ
′
2, . . . , θ
′
j−1) and θj:p ≡ (θj , θj+1, . . . , θp), the transition kernel
for updating a subchain j is chosen as
K(θj , dθ
′
j) = P (Θj ∈ dθ
′
j | θ
′
1:(j−1), θj:p, y)
= P (U < α | θ′1:(j−1), θj:p, θ
′
j , y)PΘ˜j|Θ,Y (Θ˜j ∈ dθ
′
j | θ
′
1:(j−1), θj:p, y)
+ (1− a)1{θj∈dθ′j},
where
a =
∫
θ′j∈R
P (U < α, | θ′1:(j−1), θj:p, θ
′
j , y)PΘ˜j|Θ,Y (Θ˜j ∈ dθ
′
j | θ
′
1:(j−1), θj:p, y).
As an algorithm this works by first drawing an auxiliary random variate
Θ˜j from an instrumental (proposal) distribution. The proposed value θ
′
j is
accepted with probability
α = min
{
1,
PY |Θ(Y ∈ dy | θ
′
1:j , θ(j+1):p)PΘ(Θ1:j ∈ dθ
′
1:j ,Θ(j+1):p ∈ dθ(j+1):p)
PY |Θ(Y ∈ dy | θ′1:(j−1), θj:p)PΘ(Θ1:(j−1) ∈ dθ
′
1:(j−1),Θj:p ∈ dθj:p)
×
PΘ˜j |Θ,Y (Θ˜j ∈ dθj | θ
′
1:j, θ(j+1):p, y)
PΘ˜j |Θ,Y (Θ˜j ∈ dθ
′
j | θ
′
1:(j−1), θj:p, y)
}
(8)
= min
{
1,
PΘ,Y,Θ˜j(Θ1:j ∈ dθ
′
1:j ,Θ(j+1):p ∈ dθ(j+1):p, Y ∈ dy, Θ˜j ∈ dθj)
PΘ,Y,Θ˜j(Θ1:(j−1) ∈ dθ
′
1:(j−1),Θj:p ∈ dθj:p, Y ∈ dy, Θ˜j ∈ dθ
′
j)
}
by drawing an auxiliary random variate U ∼ Uniform[0, 1]. Otherwise, the
chain stays at the current state θj . Depending on the choice of the proposal
distribution, this method is known as the Metropolis or Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm (by Metropolis et al., 1953; Hastings, 1970). Two things should
be noted here. First, the target distribution here is the posterior full con-
ditional distribution PΘj |Θ−j ,Y , but this has been replaced in (8) with the
joint posterior PΘ|Y . This can be done because the two are proportional
with respect to Θj. Second, the Bayes’ formula (2) has been applied here
to present the posterior as a function of the likelihood PY |Θ and the prior
PΘ, with the denominators PY canceling out. Also, any multiplicative terms
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in the likelihood not depending on the parameters cancel out and thus it is
sufficient to specify the likelihood only up to a constant. The functional form
of what is left is known and can be numerically evaluated. One commonly
used choice for a proposal distribution, known as random walk Metropolis, is
Θ˜j | θj ∼ N(θj , s2), where the (fixed) standard deviation s may be adjusted
during an initial “burn-in” period to achieve an acceptance rate which pro-
duces a well mixing chain. This proposal is symmetric and thus the proposal
ratio cancels out of (8).
In the Metropolis-Hastings ratio (8) the dimension p of the parameter
vector was fixed, with the same joint measure (the product of target and
proposal distributions) PΘ,Y,Θ˜j appearing in both the numerator and denom-
inator. Use of this standard form is limited to moves within a fixed parameter
subspace, since in moves between parameter subspaces of different dimension
the measures in the numerator and denominator would typically not match.
An important extension to Markov chain Monte Carlo was made by Green
(1995) who showed that such moves are possible by requiring that the joint
measure is absolutely continuous with respect to some appropriate symmetric
measure. By the Radon-Nikodym theorem, the joint measure then has a den-
sity with respect to the symmetric measure. The Metropolis-Hastings ratio
can then be written as a ratio of these densities. The symmetry ensures re-
versibility of the moves, hence the name “reversible jump MCMC”. It should
be noted that also standard Metropolis-Hastings moves are reversible (sat-
isfy the detailed balance condition, e.g. Robert and Casella, 2004, p. 230), so
again the name may not be the most descriptive, unless it is taken to mean
the generalized Metropolis-Hastings procedure as a whole, and not just the
Green’s extension. A variable dimension algorithm would be needed, for in-
stance, in simulating realizations from a point process of the type (6), due to
the random number of points in a realization (see Møller and Waagepetersen,
2004, p. 112-115, for an example of such an algorithm).
In addition to the methods outlined above, Bayesian inference requires
specification of a prior distribution. Sometimes no strong prior information
exists or its use is not seen as appropriate. Thereby, much attention in
Bayesian literature has been paid to the development of noninformative (or
reference) priors (see e.g. Berger and Bernardo, 1992, for a review). The non-
informativeness is then defined with respect to some specific criterion; the
best known example is the Jeffreys’ prior (Jeffreys, 1946) which is propor-
tional to the square root of the determinant of the Fisher information. It is
invariant to one-to-one transformation of parametrization. Although Fisher
information does not depend on the data other than through the number
of observations, Jeffreys’ prior ties the prior specification to the likelihood
specification, and thus has been seen as violating the likelihood principle (see
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Berger and Wolpert, 1988, p. 21). Nevertheless, in many cases it produces
an intuitively plausible result; for example, in the case of Gaussian observa-
tions Yi | µ, σ ∼ N(µ, σ
2), the Jeffreys’ priors for the mean (location) and
standard deviation (scale) parameters are f(µ) ∝ 1 (flat over the real line)
and f(σ) ∝ 1/σ, respectively. The latter prior assigns the same probability
to any interval (a, ca) with fixed c and thus is noninformative on the “scale”
of the observations. These priors are improper (nonintegrable) but can be
used as long as the posterior remains proper (is integrable, and thus is a
probability measure).
The noninformativeness may well be understood without any information
criterion other than the probability measures involved. If we wanted to be a
priori noninformative about the parameters, we would like the inference to be
driven only by the data and not the prior. It is easy to see from (8) that this
can be achieved by specifying the prior to be flat (uniform) over its support.
The posterior is then proportional to the likelihood, with the Metropolis-
Hastings moves with a symmetric proposal based only on the likelihood ratio.
If the support interval is infinite, such a prior is improper, in which case it
is required that the likelihood is integrable with respect to the parameters.
Since this may be difficult to check in practice (e.g. Robert and Casella,
2004, p. 406), it may be preferable to favor proper priors where possible. An
important application of improper priors are intrinsic autoregressive models,
(see e.g. Rue and Held, 2005), which are defined through full conditional
distributions, but do not have a joint distribution. Such distributions may
be used as a part of hierarchical parametrization, but not as a model for
observed data.
Non-invariance of flat priors to transformation of parametrization is some-
times seen as a critical issue in the Bayesian approach (e.g. Cox, 2006, p.
73-75). However, if the prior is specified as noninformative for the current
parametrization of interest, it is difficult to see why non-informativeness with
respect to some other parametrization would be relevant. Since no univer-
sally accepted solution for “objective” prior specification exists, the Bayesian
approach has been rejected by many, albeit sometimes acknowledging its su-
periority in some other aspects, on the basis of striving for scientific objectiv-
ity (e.g. Efron, 1986; Cox, 2006, p. 199). Bayesians, for their part, value more
highly the internal coherency and simplicity of their framework. Moreover,
the fundamental difference between the Bayesian approach and its competi-
tors lies in the interpretation of the concept of probability, rather than the
prior specification (cf. Jaynes, 2003, p. 499-500). If noninformativeness in
prior specification is not the aim, then it is enough to require that the prior
assumptions made are explicitly stated and that the analysis is repeatable
with alternative priors.
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3.2 Maximum likelihood
Should only the likelihood function be used for inference on the unknown
parameters, the Bayes’ formula can be better interpreted in the form
PΘ|Y (Θ ∈ dθ | Y = y)
PΘ(Θ ∈ dθ)
θ
∝ PY |Θ(Y ∈ dy | Θ = θ),
where the proportion on the left hand side reflects the information lost when
the prior is ignored. In the previous section it was noted that flat priors
over their support are noninformative in the sense that then the inferences
are based on the likelihood only. While formula (1) might have implied that
posterior mean would have a special status as the “estimator” to be used in
the inference, any other descriptive statistic of the posterior would be equally
allowed. Assuming that the relevant densities exist, now if fΘ(θ) ∝ 1, it so
happens that
argmax
θ
fΘ|Y (θ | y) = argmax
θ
fY |Θ(y | θ). (9)
With flat priors over infinite intervals, the posterior may or may not be a
proper distribution. However, the posterior mode may be a sensible statistic
regardless of whether the posterior distribution is proper, which would not be
the case for, say, the posterior mean. Hence, with such flat priors, the right
hand side of (9), known as the maximum likelihood estimator, may be used
for making inference on the parameters without the requirement for a proper
posterior distribution. We limit the discussion here to unimodal likelihoods;
multimodal likelihoods are usually pathological cases. In addition to a point
estimate, some kind of estimate for its accuracy, based on the observed data,
is needed as well. As noted previously, the posterior distribution itself is a
(probability) measure for this accuracy (cf. Jaynes, 2003, p. 501), which can
then be expressed with any appropriate descriptive statistic, such as stan-
dard deviation or credible interval, calculated from a random sample drawn
from the posterior using the methods outlined in Section 3.1. An alternative
approach would be to use deterministic Gaussian (Laplace) approximation
for the posterior. Although this method in direct posterior approximation
has seen limited use since the breakthrough of MCMC methods, it is useful in
constructing multivariate proposal distributions (e.g. Rue and Held, 2005, p.
167-171). Recently, Laplace approximations in Bayesian inference have been
resurrected by Rue et al. (2009). Use of Gaussian approximation is better
justified in the above situation with flat priors, since the posterior is then
proportional to the likelihood and by (3), the likelihood is often a product
of conditionally independent contributions, making the approximation more
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accurate as n increases (Clayton and Hills, 1993, p. 78). Introducing the
notations log fY |Θ(y | θ) ≡ l(θ) and argmaxθ fY |Θ(y | θ) = argmaxθ l(θ) ≡ θˆ,
the approximation is based on a second order Taylor expansion for the log-
likelihood at its mode:
l(θ) = l(θˆ) + l′(θˆ)(θ − θˆ) +
1
2
l′′(θˆ)(θ − θˆ)2 +O((θ − θˆ)3)
l′(θˆ)=0
= l(θˆ) +
1
2
l′′(θˆ)(θ − θˆ)2 +O((θ − θˆ)3)
⇒ l(θ)− l(θˆ) ≈
1
2
l′′(θˆ)(θ − θˆ)2.
The above suggests that, with flat priors, the posterior around its mode
could be approximated by the Gaussian distribution N(θˆ,−l′′(θˆ)−1) (with
the mode θˆ considered as fixed), and that the approximation becomes pro-
gressively more accurate when the number of observations increases. The
asymptotic result holds true also with proper priors with some added regular-
ity conditions (Walker, 1969; Cox and Hinkley, 1974, p. 399-400). Standard
asymptotic theory for the maximum likelihood estimator (e.g. Cox, 2006, p.
100-102) obtains a very similar looking result; approximate convergence in
distribution θˆ
∼
→ N(θ, E[−l′′(θ)]−1) when n→∞. Here E[−l′′(θ)], the Fisher
information, is unknown, and is in practice replaced with the observed infor-
mation −l′′(θˆ) at the maximum likelihood point. The roles of the parameter
values and estimator have here been reversed, with the mode θˆ now consid-
ered as random and θ fixed. In practice, this reversal is of no consequence
(though in principle the consequences are drastic), since the inference is in
both cases based on using θˆ as a point estimator and −l′′(θˆ)−1 as an estimator
for its accuracy. Thus maximum likelihood inference, whether understood in
terms of its dedicated theory, or as approximate Bayesian inference, as in the
presentation herein, can be carried out by first maximizing the log-likelihood
function, calculating its second derivative (or Hessian matrix) at the maxi-
mum likelihood point, and inverting the latter. Standard numerical tools are
available for these tasks.
4 Inference and incomplete observation
4.1 A framework for incomplete observation problems
D. B. Rubin (1976) in his paper “Inference and missing data” laid out some
general conditions for valid statistical inference in the presence of missing
data, to be reviewed below. The term “missing data” traditionally refers to
elements in a data matrix which for one reason or another have not been
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observed (e.g. Little and Rubin, 1987, p. 3). This meaning is narrow in
the sense that it refers only to observable quantities which would have been
observed, say, had the data collection methods been better, had there been
more resources or had the study subjects been more cooperative. An example
of a situation involving such missing data is nonresponse in sample surveys
(e.g. Rubin, 1987; Sa¨rndal and Lundstro¨m, 2005), where the data items to
be collected are decided in advance, but all of them are not obtained for
reasons mostly outside the survey makers’ control. Instead of missing data
we prefer here to talk about incomplete observation or even more generally,
incomplete information. As discussed in Section 2.2, statistical inference
essentially is quantifying our incomplete information on the phenomena of
interest, given actually observed information, using probability measures as
instruments. In practice incomplete observation is ever-present in statistical
inference and what unifies different situations involving missing data or other
kinds of incomplete observation is that all of them can be handled using
exactly the same statistical methods. This is because for a Bayesian any
unobserved quantity, be it a parameter, missing data item, latent variable,
random effect, or an underlying true value with an imprecise measurement, is
the same kind of mathematical object, that is, a random variable without an
observed realization. Random variables with an observed realization can be
conditioned upon, and given the observations, the uncertainty that is left can
be expressed by the joint posterior distribution of all unobserved quantities.
One may on philosophical grounds argue for separation of quantities into
“ontological” and “epistemological” (e.g. Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh, 2004,
p. 4); not wanting to wade into such discussion here, it is sufficient to note
that in probability-based statistical inference such a distinction does not
exist, and thus all inference problems involving incomplete observation can
be presented under a single unified framework, that is, probability.
4.2 Two-phase study design
Rubin (1987) presented a probabilistic approach to sample surveys subject
to nonresponse. Here we apply similar principles to two-phase study designs
where the first phase is, for instance, a sample survey of some population of
interest and the second phase involves a subsampling within the first phase
sample, utilizing the information collected at the first phase (e.g. Sa¨rndal
et al., 1992, p. 344). As a side note, in epidemiological literature the term
“two-stage design” is sometimes used interchangeably with “two-phase” (e.g.
Breslow and Cain, 1988; Zhao and Lipsitz, 1992; Langholz, 2007); however,
in light of sampling literature, the latter term is correct, with the former
referring to clustered designs where subsampling is carried out within clusters
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selected in the first stage (see Sa¨rndal et al., 1992, p. 134). The use of two-
phase data collection is usually motivated by cost-effectiveness concerns, so
that information which is easier or less expensive to obtain is collected on a
larger group in the first phase, and this information in turn can be utilized for
constructing a more efficient second phase sampling design to collect further
information on a smaller subgroup (see e.g. Karvanen et al., 2009). A related
concept here is that of sampling frame; according to Sa¨rndal et al. (1992, p.
9), this is defined as any materials or devices which identify and allow access
to the elements of the (finite) target population of interest. The sampling
frame includes also any auxiliary information which may be utilized in the
sampling; using the auxiliary information, the sampling design can be made
more efficient or tailor-made for specific study purposes. Population registers
are commonly used as sampling frames in the Nordic countries. “Study base”
is a term sometimes used in the same meaning as sampling frame (Langholz
and Goldstein, 2001, for example).
Cohort sampling designs commonly utilized in epidemiological studies,
such as the case-cohort and nested case-control (risk set sampling) designs
(Prentice, 1986, Langholz and Goldstein, 1996; for further references, see
Kulathinal et al., 2007, and Article II), are examples of two-phase designs.
Here the cohort, possibly recruited using a sample survey, is often represen-
tative of some target population of interest. The cohort, together with the
information collected on all cohort members, such as longitudinal follow-up
data, forms a sampling frame for the second phase selection, which is typ-
ically carried out to collect additional covariate data. We introduce some
notation to cover such designs, for the most part following Rubin (1987,
p. 28-30). Let F = {1, . . . , N} be the (fixed) first phase frame popula-
tion, and XF = {Xi : i ∈ F} the variables available from the frame. Let
IF = {Ii : i ∈ F} be the vector of indicators for inclusion in the first phase
sample, and let YF = {Yi : i ∈ F} represent the variables to be collected on
the subjects with Ii = 1. The joint probability distribution of the inclusion
indicators is called a sampling design (or sampling mechanism; Rubin, 1987,
p. 35). If the mechanism depends only on the information available from the
frame so that IF ⊥ YF | XF , it is said to be unconfounded (with YF ) (Rubin,
1987, p. 36).
It should be noted here that traditional finite population inference con-
siders the quantities in the population to be fixed, with the uncertainty in
the inference induced only by the random sampling. Further, the parameters
to be estimated are taken to be some functions of the variable values in the
target population (see Sa¨rndal et al., 1992, p. 39). In contrast, here we adopt
a probabilistic approach where we assume exchangeability over unit indices
of the random vectors (Xi, Yi), i ∈ F , with the exchangeability extending to
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further units N + 1, N + 2, . . . outside the set F . The latter postulate de-
mands an explanation, since it appears to be completely contradictory with
the idea of a finite population. However, since our aim in making such a
postulate is to apply de Finetti’s theorem for introducing a parametric prob-
ability model and its parameters, the fundamental question here is what kind
of parameters we are interested in. Again, we assume that the parameters
can be interpreted to be the properties of a generic further individual, outside
the set F , but in some suitable sense similar to the individuals in F . This
similarity is defined by exchangeability, and the parameters introduced by
applying the representation theorem characterize both the individuals in F
and the further generic individual.
It is possible that instead of the above, the parameters of interest really
are some simple functions of the values (Xi, Yi) specifically for i ∈ F . An
example might be the rate of unemployment in Finland, in which case, tak-
ing F to be the frame population of Finland obtained from the population
register, and Yi = (Y1i, Y2i) being the unemployment status and labor force
participation of individual i, respectively, the population parameter would be
defined as θ =
∑N
i=1 Y1i/
∑N
i=1 Y2i. It seems apparent that i.i.d. probability
models are not an appropriate tool for making inference on such parameters.
However, as soon as the parameter of interest describes, for instance, the
association between two variables, we move onto the realm of the parametric
probability model. This is because we then usually believe (or hope) that
the parameter has some other (say, causal) interpretation beside the narrow
finite population definition. There are some similarities between the finite
population parameter definition and the definition through the representa-
tion theorem (3), in the sense that, in the latter the parameters are a limit
of some function of an infinite exchangeable sequence of random variables
(Bernardo, 1996). However, the important difference is that in the latter
case the parameters describe the common properties of every subset of such
random variables, while in the former case the interpretation of parameters
is confined to some specific finite set.
Alternatively, in the sense of Diaconis and Freedman (1980), we could
have assumed exchangeability only in the (hopefully large enough) finite set
F , and applied the representation theorem in the subset C = {i : Ii = 1} ⊂ F
(the realized sample), hoping that it would still give a reasonable approxi-
mation. However, due to the reasons stated, we see no real need for such
a restriction, and opt to proceed with the assumption that exchangeability
extends to infinite sequences.
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Now by applying (3) we can write a joint probability distribution
P (XF , YF ) =
∫
θ
∫
φ
[
N∏
i=1
P (Yi, Xi | θ, φ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ,Φ ∈ dφ)
Θ⊥Φ
=
∫
θ
[
N∏
i=1
P (Yi | Xi, θ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ)
×
∫
φ
[
N∏
i=1
P (Xi | φ)
]
P (Φ ∈ dφ) (10)
= P (YF | XF )P (XF ).
Again, we suppress the subscripts determining the probability distributions
and do not distinguish random variables and their realized values, whenever
it is clear from the context. Here we assume that only the parameters Θ are
of interest. Let C = {i : Ii = 1} ⊆ F be a set of indices representing the
subjects on whom the Yi variables are observed; unlike F , this is a random
set. Writing a likelihood expression for the set F as in (10) would involve in-
tegration over the unobserved elements YF\C. If the frame population is very
large (for instance, the population of a country), such a likelihood is rarely
used directly, though exceptions exist (see e.g. Pitka¨niemi et al., 2009). Here
we restrict the attention to situations where we can ignore the first phase
sampling design. Sampling from a finite population typically means that in-
clusion indicators IF are not independent. However, by applying de Finetti’s
theorem and assuming unconfounded sampling mechanism, we can still ob-
tain the customary product form for the likelihood expression. Consider
now the probability distribution for observed data (IF , XF , YC), which fac-
tors into P (IF , XF , YC) = P (YC | IF , XF )P (IF | XF )P (XF ), reflecting the
order of data collection. The latter two terms give no information on the
parameters Θ if Xi are observed on all i ∈ F and the probability distribution
for IF depends on XF only, so that IF ⊥ Θ | XF . The remaining term can
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be further written as
P (YC | IF , XF ) =
∫
yF\C
P (YC, YF\C ∈ dyF\C | IF , XF )
=
∫
yF\C
P (YF ∈ dyF | IF , XF )
IF⊥YF |XF
=
∫
yF\C
P (YF ∈ dyF | XF )
(10)
=
∫
yF\C
∫
θ
[
N∏
i=1
P (Yi ∈ dyi | Xi, θ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ)
=
∫
θ
[∏
i∈C
P (Yi | Xi, θ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ).
Therefore, with these assumptions, we can ignore the first phase sampling
design and write the likelihood expression directly for the obtained cohort
C. Now the set C determines the sampling frame for the second phase, and
observed values of YC are available in the second phase sampling design.
Analogously to above, let RC = {Ri : i ∈ C} be the inclusion indicators
in the second phase selection and let ZC = {Zi : i ∈ C} be additional
information, to be collected only on the subjects with Ri = 1. Further, let
O = {i : Ri = 1} ⊆ C be an index set, representing the individuals on whom
the Zi are collected. The following sections review different alternatives for
analysis of such study designs.
4.3 Full likelihood
If we assume the second phase sampling design to be unconfounded (with
ZC), meaning that RC ⊥ ZC | XC , YC , the probability distribution for ob-
served data can again be factored to reflect the order of data collection as
P (RC , XC , YC, ZO) = P (ZO | RC , XC , YC)P (RC | XC , YC)P (YC | XC)P (XC).
It seems reasonable to assume the second phase sampling mechanism to be
independent of ZC if none of the values Zi have yet been observed when
the selection probabilities are fixed. However, in many sampling designs the
selection probabilities are determined only implicitly. Nevertheless, if the
observed Zi values are never utilized in the sampling procedure, it fulfils
the independence condition. The second term in the above now fixes the
sampling design and gives no information on the model parameters.
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In the previous section we saw that with the assumptions made therein,
we can ignore the first phase sampling design and consider the obtained
cohort C as fixed. Analogously to the previous section, we assume exchange-
ability over unit indices of the random vectors (Xi, Yi, Zi), i ∈ C, and the
extension to infinite sequences, resulting in the existence of parametric mod-
els P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ) and P (Xi | φ) and the corresponding prior distributions
P (Θ ∈ dθ) and P (Φ ∈ dφ). It should be noted that Rubin (1987, p. 104)
assumed also the response indicators to be exchangeable. We do not make
the corresponding assumption on the inclusion indicators Ri, since unlike re-
sponse propensity, inclusion in the sample is not a property of the individuals
themselves. In any case, such an assumption is not needed for obtaining the
results that follow. Also, due to the reservations expressed in Section 2.2,
below we always apply de Finetti’s representation theorem in the full cohort
C rather than in the random subset O.
If the parameters Φ are of no interest, we can restrict the attention to
the first and third terms of the above joint distribution, which can be further
written as
P (ZO | RC , XC , YC)P (YC | XC)
=
∫
zC\O
P (ZO, ZC\O ∈ dzC\O | RC , XC , YC)P (YC | XC)
=
∫
zC\O
P (ZC ∈ dzC | RC , XC, YC)P (YC | XC)
RC⊥ZC |XC ,YC
=
∫
zC\O
P (ZC ∈ dzC | XC , YC)P (YC | XC)
=
∫
zC\O
P (YC , ZC ∈ dzC | XC)
=
∫
zC\O
∫
θ
[∏
i∈C
P (Yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ)
=
∫
θ
∏
i∈O
P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
∏
i∈C\O
∫
zi
P (Yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
P (Θ ∈ dθ).
Under unconfounded sampling design and the exchangeability assumption
we can then ignore the selection process behind the observations and base
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the inference on the posterior
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC , YC, ZO) (11)
θ
∝
∏
i∈O
P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
∏
i∈C\O
∫
zi
P (Yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
P (Θ ∈ dθ).
This same result was obtained in Article II from a non-Bayesian point of
view, without reference to de Finetti’s result. The independence assump-
tion over the unit indices (given the parameters) there corresponds to the
exchangeability herein. We call the likelihood expression in (11) a full likeli-
hood, in the sense that, being a product over the individual contributions in
the full cohort C, it utilizes all observed data.
In most of the common cohort sampling designs the selection is condition-
ally independent of the information to be collected under the design, given
the data observed on all cohort members. However, it is possible to imagine
sequential sampling designs (for instance, to meet a given quota in different
exposure status categories, cf. Langholz and Goldstein, 2001, p. 70), where
already observed values of Zi can affect the sampling probabilities of later
observations (for instance, stop when quota are full, continue otherwise).
However, it is possible to show that a product form likelihood can be ob-
tained also in this case. The situation is then analogous to Rubin (1987, p.
51-53), in that the joint distribution of the inclusion indicators RC may de-
pend on all observed data but not on the unobserved values themselves. We
then say that the sampling mechanism is ignorable, or equivalently, that the
unobserved data are missing at random (Rubin, 1976, p. 584). In the survey
nonresponse problem discussed in Rubin (1987), the actual response mech-
anism is usually unknown, and likelihood-based inference requires (possibly
unverifiable) assumptions about it. In contrast, the mechanism producing
missingness in the second phase data collection is known; it is fixed by the
second phase sampling design. We say that observations ZC\O are missing
by design (e.g. Wacholder and Weinberg, 1994; Wacholder, 1996).
Same principles apply when there are other missing data in addition to
those missing by design. For instance, if the covariates to be collected are
genotypes, after selection of subjects to be genotyped, it may turn out that
the DNA amount or concentration is too low or the genotyping is otherwise
unsuccessful. Another example involving further incomplete observation are
haplotypes which are only partially identifiable from unphased genotype data
(see Article I). Let M ⊆ O denote the set of subjects selected in the second
phase but for whom the data collection was unsuccessful. If we assume that
these data are missing at random, the posterior distribution can be written
34
as
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC , YC , ZO\M) (12)
θ
∝
 ∏
i∈O\M
P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
∏
i∈C\O∪M
∫
zi
P (Yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
P (Θ ∈ dθ).
The likelihood expression here involves integration over the missing observa-
tions. If the integration can be carried out either analytically or numerically,
the inference on parameters Θ can now utilize directly either the Bayesian
methods outlined in Section 3.1, or the maximum likelihood methods in Sec-
tion 3.2. Alternatively, the estimation could be based on the joint posterior
of all unobserved quantities P (Θ, ZC\O∪M | RC , XC , YC, ZO\M), and a Gibbs
sampler from the corresponding full conditional distributions
P (Zi ∈ dzi | RC , XC , YC, ZC\{i}, θ)
zi
∝ P (Yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ), (13)
i ∈ C \O ∪M and
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC , YC, ZC)
θ
∝
[∏
i∈C
P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ) (14)
(see Robert and Casella, 2004, p. 357-358). This approach is known as
Bayesian data augmentation (see Kulathinal and Arjas, 2006, for an appli-
cation). It is equivalent to (proper) multiple imputation from the posterior
distribution of missing data when the imputation and analysis models are
the same (Rubin, 1987, p. 113). The advantage of using data augmentation
is that the (complete data) likelihood expression in (14) is in a standard
form which is often computationally more convenient than the observed data
likelihood in (12); for example, conjugate distributions can then be utilized
in the simulation from the posterior (14).
Maximum likelihood counterpart of Bayesian data augmentation is known
as the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977,
Robert and Casella, 2004, p. 176-177, applied here in Article I). Here the
expectation step involves taking the expectation of the complete data log-
likelihood with respect to the posterior distribution of the missing data at
the current parameter estimates. In the maximization step this expectation
is maximized with respect to the parameters. These steps are iterated until
the parameter estimates converge (to the maximum likelihood estimate). The
potential advantage of using the EM instead of direct maximization of the
observed data likelihood again lies in the computationally more convenient
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form of the (expected) complete data log-likelihood, which may be easier to
maximize, especially if ready-made numerical tools or closed form maximum
likelihood estimators exist for the standard form likelihood expression.
In Articles II and III the simulation studies carried out for comparing
the efficiencies of different likelihood and pseudolikelihood (see section 4.5)
expressions utilized real data (for instance, time-to-event responses observed
for a cohort), with additional covariate data with specified distributions and
effect sizes simulated using the above described two step Gibbs sampling
procedure. First the additional covariates were drawn from posterior distri-
butions of the type (13) and then the unknown (non-fixed) parameters in
the simulation model were drawn from conditional distributions of the type
(14). A number of datasets combining the real observations and the simu-
lated covariates were produced by iterating these two steps. This procedure
corresponds to drawing multiple imputations from a Bayesian (proper) impu-
tation model. The aim in this approach was to make the simulation settings
more realistic compared to using completely synthetic data.
4.4 Conditional likelihood
Although the full likelihood expression obtained in the previous section is op-
timal in the sense that it utilizes all observed data, it is not entirely without
problems. For instance, if the study base is large and/or the proportion of
missing data high, the integration involved may be computationally demand-
ing. In addition, with high proportion of missing data, it is not certain that
the parameters in the model have the anticipated interpretation, with the
missing data also acting as unknown parameters. In extreme situations this
may lead to multimodal likelihoods. Furthermore, a full likelihood expression
is not applicable in situations where the study base can not be enumerated
(Wacholder, 1996, p. 146). In such cases, if the mechanism that has produced
the observations is known, it makes sense to confine to the set of subjects
with completely observed data and condition the likelihood expression on this
mechanism. Here we attempt to derive and interpret conditional likelihood
from the Bayesian perspective.
Conditional likelihood is not to be confused with marginal or partial like-
lihood. We refer to Cox (1975) for the definitions and difference between
the concepts. Introduction of conditional inference is attributed to R. A.
Fisher (1890-1962) by Efron (1978, p. 238). As an elementary example of
this approach, it makes sense to condition the analysis on realized sample
size, even if the size had originally been randomly selected. Fisher’s (1956,
see also Berger and Wolpert, 1988, Chapter 2) central concept here was that
of relevant subset, which can be presented as a transformation of a random
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vector Y into a new random vector partitioned into relevant subsets (V,W ),
the transformation not depending on the unknown parameter Θ. The con-
ditional likelihood for W given the realization V = v is then defined as (Cox
and Hinkley, 1974, p. 16-17; Cox, 1975, p. 269)
PW |V,Θ(W ∈ dw | V = v,Θ = θ).
It should first be noted that, although we work under this same general def-
inition, we use conditional likelihood solely in the context of conditioning on
a sampling mechanism (in the sense of e.g. Langholz and Goldstein, 2001),
in contrast to the traditional maximum likelihood theory, where condition-
ing on an ancillary statistic (concept introduced by Fisher, 1956) is carried
out to eliminate nuisance parameters (e.g. Andersen, 1970; Kalbfleisch and
Sprott, 1970; Cox and Hinkley, 1974, p. 292-293). The partition into relevant
subsets is specified here by the realized sample. The conditioning carried out
herein does not eliminate nuisance parameters; if anything, it may increase
the number of parameters needed to be estimated. Also, we will not confine
ourselves to situations where the conditioning subset V (the inclusion indi-
cators and any other information which not included in the subset W ) would
be an ancillary statistic. We saw in Section 4.2 (first phase sampling) that
the pair of random vectors V = (IF , XF ) together indeed are an ancillary
statistic, that is, their joint distribution does not depend on the parameter
of interest Θ. However, we shall see that in the second phase sampling the
natural conditioning subset is V = (RC , XC, YC\O), which obviously depends
on Θ. Such a conditioning will lose information on Θ compared to inference
based on full likelihood, but will nevertheless lead to an intuitively plausible
likelihood expression.
In the well known retrospective likelihood for case-control designs (see,
for example, Seaman and Richardson, 2001, and Cox, 2006, p. 154-157)
the conditioning corresponds to the order of the data collection. The data
collection under cohort sampling designs is also retrospective in the sense that
the covariates ZO are collected after observing all of YC . In full likelihood
inference the order of data collection is not relevant, since all observed data
informative of the parameters of interest are included in the likelihood. In
conditional likelihood inference the split into relevant subsets determines how
much information is lost in the conditioning. In the following, to minimize
the information loss, we shall proceed to write the likelihood jointly for W =
(YO, ZO), rather than conditioning on either one. Hence, the order in which
these observations were collected becomes again irrelevant to the problem.
No further justification for using the conditional approach is needed in
situations where we cannot parameterize the joint distribution of (W,V ) in
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terms of the parameters of interest, but can do so for the conditional distri-
bution PW |V,Θ (cf. conditional exchangeability and full exchangeability, see
Section 4.7). An example of a situation where an enumerable frame popu-
lation is not available but the sampling mechanism known is late entry/left
truncation in follow-up studies. (Target population would be the underlying
unobserved birth cohort.) Because only the individuals alive at the time of
a cross-sectional cohort recruitment are observed, the likelihood expression
for time-to-event data will then have to be conditioned on survival until the
study outset (Guo, 1993, p. 229). If the event of interest is non-fatal, indi-
viduals with a prevalent condition similar to the outcome of interest at the
start of the follow-up are usually excluded from the analysis, corresponding
to conditioning on healthy status at the study outset (Commenges et al.,
1998, p. 1976). However, in Article III we proposed a conditional likeli-
hood expression which utilizes the information from the individuals with a
prevalent disease.
In the present context of a two-phase study design, the sampling frame
is known, but for the previously mentioned reasons it may be desirable to
limit the analysis to the group selected in the second phase, corresponding to
conditioning the likelihood expression on the second phase sampling design.
Applying Bayes’ formula for the posterior distribution given all observed
quantities and marginalizing over the nuisance parameters, we get
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC , YC, ZO)
=
∫
φ
P (Θ ∈ dθ,Φ ∈ dφ | RC , XC , YC, ZO)
θ
∝
∫
φ
P (RC , YC, ZO | XC , θ, φ)P (XC | φ)P (Φ ∈ dφ)P (Θ ∈ dθ)
(RC ,YC ,ZO)⊥Φ|XC
= P (RC , YO, YC\O, ZO | XC , θ)P (XC)P (Θ ∈ dθ)
θ
∝ P (YO, ZO | RC , XC , YC\O, θ)
× P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)P (YC\O | XC , θ)P (Θ ∈ dθ),
or equivalently,
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC , YC, ZO)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)P (YC\O | XC , θ)
θ
∝ P (YO, ZO | RC , XC, YC\O, θ)P (Θ ∈ dθ).
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Here the first term on the right hand side can be further developed as
P (YO, ZO | RC , XC , YC\O, θ)
=
P (ZO | RC , XC, YC , θ)P (RC, YC | XC , θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)P (YC\O | XC , θ)
RC⊥Θ|XC ,YC
=
P (ZO | RC , XC, YC , θ)P (RC | XC , YC)P (YC | XC , θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)P (YC\O | XC , θ)
θ
∝
P (ZO | RC , XC , YC, θ)P (YC | XC , θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)P (YC\O | XC , θ)
=
∫
zC\O
P (ZC ∈ dzC | RC , XC , YC , θ)P (YC | XC , θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
∫
yO
∫
zC
P (YC ∈ dyC , ZC ∈ dzC | XC , θ)
RC⊥ZC |XC ,YC
=
∫
zC\O
P (YC, ZC ∈ dzC | XC , θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
∫
yO
∫
zC
P (YC ∈ dyC, ZC ∈ dzC | XC , θ)
=
∫
zC\O
∏
i∈C P (Yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
∫
yO
∫
zC
∏
i∈C P (Yi ∈ dyi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
=
∏
i∈O P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
∏
i∈C\O P (Yi | Xi, θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
∏
i∈C\O P (Yi | Xi, θ)
=
∏
i∈O P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
,
where the products followed from the same exchangeability assumptions that
were made in the previous section. We now have
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC , YC , ZO)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)P (YC\O | XC , θ)
θ
∝
∏
i∈O P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
P (Θ ∈ dθ),
(15)
or because
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC, YC\O)
=
∫
φ
P (Θ ∈ dθ,Φ ∈ dφ | RC , XC, YC\O)
θ
∝
∫
φ
P (RC, YC\O | XC , θ, φ)P (XC | φ)P (Φ ∈ dφ)P (Θ ∈ dθ)
(RC ,YC\O)⊥Φ|XC
= P (RC , YC\O | XC , θ)P (XC)P (Θ ∈ dθ)
θ
∝ P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)P (YC\O | XC , θ)P (Θ ∈ dθ),
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equivalently,
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC, YC , ZO)
P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC , YC\O)
θ
∝
∏
i∈O P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
. (16)
Here the right hand side is the conditional likelihood. Its numerator is just
the likelihood expression restricted to set O, and thereby involving no miss-
ing data. However, due to the second phase selection (which may depend
on all of YC), the set O in itself is not necessarily representative of C (or
F ), and thus the numerator alone would not result in valid inferences on
the parameters Θ. This is represented in the likelihood expression by its
denominator, which we call a correction term (or ascertainment correction,
see Clayton, 2003). It should first be noted that this term will indeed depend
on the parameters since it is not conditioned on all of YC . Secondly, whether
the correction term simplifies into a product form over the individual contri-
butions depends on the sampling mechanism used; in the general case it will
not simplify. Below we shall present two examples of sampling designs and
the resulting conditional likelihood correction terms. Generally the problem
in conditional likelihood correction terms is to represent them as functions
of parameters estimable from the data. This may involve introducing new
nuisance parameters (cf. Article III, p. 580-581).
Bayesian inference on parameters Θ is possible if the right hand side of
(15) is integrable over θ. In this case the left hand side could be called
a “conditional” posterior distribution (Ma et al., 2007, p. 603-604). It is
obvious that this is not the same posterior distribution as (11) because the
observed information on the set C \O is not utilized here. In fact, the form
(16) shows that using (15) is equivalent to ignoring the observed information
in P (Θ ∈ dθ | RC , XC , YC\O), and replacing it with just the prior P (Θ ∈ dθ).
Maximum likelihood inference using a conditional likelihood would proceed
as outlined in Section 3.2. If the data collection was unsuccessful for subjects
M in the group O selected in the second phase, the likelihood expression can
be written analogously to (12) as∏
i∈O\M P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
∏
i∈M
∫
zi
P (Yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
.
As an example, consider a frequency matching design (Langholz and
Goldstein, 2001, p. 68), where all cases (individuals with an event of in-
terest during follow-up, denoted as Yi = 1) in the cohort C are selected in
the second phase and m controls are selected per each case from the set of
non-cases (Yi = 0) in C. Let |C| = n and the number of cases in the cohort
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∑
i∈C Yi = d. Now the second phase sample size is |O| = d + md. Such a
sampling design is characterized by the joint probability distribution
P (RC | XC , YC) = P (RC | YC) = 1/
(
n− d
md
)
.
The conditional likelihood correction term now becomes
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
=
∑
yO
∫
zO
P (RC, YO = yO, ZO ∈ dzO | XC , YC\O, θ)
=
∑
yO
∫
zO
P (RC | XC , YC , ZO, θ)P (YO = yO, ZO ∈ dzO | XC , YC\O, θ)
RC⊥(XC ,ZO,Θ)|YC
=
∑
yO :
∑
i∈O yi=d
1(
n−d
md
) ∫
zO
P (YO = yO, ZO ∈ dzO | XC , YC\O, θ).
Here
P (YO, ZO | XC , YC\O, θ) =
P (YC, ZO | XC , θ)
P (YC\O | XC , θ)
=
∫
zC\O
∏
i∈C P (Yi = yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)∑
yO
∫
zC
∏
i∈C P (Yi = yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
=
∏
i∈O P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)
∏
i∈C\O P (Yi | Xi, θ)∏
i∈C\O P (Yi | Xi, θ)
=
∏
i∈O
P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ), (17)
and we get
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ) =
∑
yO:
∑
i∈O yi=d
1(
n−d
md
) ∏
i∈O
∫
zi
P (Yi = yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ).
It should be noted here that the correction term depends on the parameters
through the same parametric model P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ) as the numerator of the
conditional likelihood, and thus the obtained likelihood expression is indeed
applicable for parameter estimation. However, the correction term in this
case does not simplify into a product form (its enumeration requires going
through all yO vectors involving d cases). This reflects the interdependence
of the inclusion indicators RC in the frequency matching design where the
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sample size is fixed. The baseline rate of the events is not estimable from this
likelihood expression, since under this design the conditioning on RC fixes
the number of events in the cohort (Langholz and Goldstein, 2001, p. 68).
This is also the case for the standard retrospective likelihood for case-control
designs, which conditions directly on the event indicators (see Seaman and
Richardson, 2001, p. 1076).
Bernoulli sampling is characterized by the joint probability distribution
P (RC | XC , YC) =
∏
i∈C
P (Ri | Xi, Yi) =
∏
i∈C
pi(Xi, Yi)
Ri(1− pi(Xi, Yi))
1−Ri .
Here the inclusion indicators Ri are independent while the realized sample
size is random (see Sa¨rndal et al., 1992, p. 62-63). In contrast to matched
designs, some case-cohort designs can be represented as Bernoulli sampling.
Let us consider a simplified situation where Yi is the case-status for subject i
at the end of the follow-up period and Xi is the subject’s age at the start of
the follow-up. If all cases are selected, P (Ri | Xi, Yi = 1) = 1. A subcohort
of a fixed expected size is sampled independently, without regard to the case-
status, with probabilities which may depend on subject’s age; the selection
probability for non-cases is then P (Ri = 1|Xi, Yi = 0) = pi(Xi). Now the
expected sample size is |O| = d+
∑
i∈C 1{Yi=0}pi(Xi), while the realized sam-
ple size is random. The conditional likelihood correction term under such a
case-cohort design becomes
P (RC | XC , YC\O, θ)
=
∑
yO
∫
zO
P (RC , YO = yO, ZO ∈ dzO | XC , YC\O, θ)
RC⊥(ZO ,Θ)|XC ,YC
=
∑
yO
∫
zO
P (RC | XC , YC)P (YO = yO, ZO ∈ dzO | XC , YC\O, θ)
(17)
=
∏
i∈C\O
P (Ri = 0 | Xi, Yi = 0)
×
∏
i∈O
∫
zi
∑
yi∈{0,1}
P (Ri = 1 | Xi, Yi = yi)P (Yi = yi, Zi ∈ dzi | Xi, θ)
θ
∝
∏
i∈O
∫
zi
[P (Yi = 1, Zi ∈ dzi, | Xi, θ) + pi(Xi)P (Yi = 0, Zi ∈ dzi, | Xi, θ)] .
Thus in this case the conditional likelihood expression assumes the product
form∏
i∈O
P (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ)∫
zi
[P (Yi = 1, Zi ∈ dzi, | Xi, θ) + pi(Xi)P (Yi = 0, Zi ∈ dzi, | Xi, θ)]
, (18)
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which corresponds to the result obtained in Article I, p. 10-11.
4.5 Pseudolikelihood
As a comparison to the previously discussed probability-based approach to
cohort sampling designs, we review here briefly an alternative approximative
method discussed by, for example, Kalbfleisch and Lawless (1988), Samuelsen
(1997) and Samuelsen et al. (2007). Consider now conditional probabilities
P (Ri = 1 | XC , YC) ≡ pii, i ∈ C, known as the first-order inclusion prob-
abilities (Sa¨rndal et al., 1992, p. 31). It should be noted that, with the
exception of Bernoulli sampling, the product of such terms does not specify
the sampling mechanism, since in sampling without replacement (with a fixed
sample size) from a finite population, the indicators Ri are not independent
(see Sa¨rndal et al., 1992, p. 30-33). Kalbfleisch and Lawless (1988, p. 153)
used the first-order inclusion probabilities for constructing an approximation
for the true complete data log-likelihood (in the full cohort) as∑
i∈O
1
pii
logP (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ) ≈
∑
i∈C
logP (Yi, Zi | Xi, θ). (19)
They refer to such an expression as a pseudolikelihood. Cox (2006, p. 152)
uses the same term for any likelihood expression that ignores some depen-
dencies between the variables. As an “estimator” for the true log-likelihood,
(19) corresponds to the Horvitz-Thompson estimator for a population total
(Horvitz and Thompson, 1952; Sa¨rndal et al., 1992, p. 42-43). Since in many
sampling mechanisms the first order inclusion probabilities are specified only
implicitly, the application of (19) may require estimation of the quantities pii.
Samuelsen (1997, p. 382) presented an estimator for the first order inclusion
probabilities in nested case-control sampling. Samuelsen et al. (2007) sug-
gested poststratification, with the cases defining their own stratum, and the
inclusion probabilities for non-cases estimated using the realized sampling
fractions within strata. With a time-to-event response Yi = (Ti, Ei), where
Ei = 1 indicates a case and Ei = 0 a non-case, if the only parameters of
interest are regression coefficients β in the semiparametric proportional haz-
ards model (Cox, 1972), the pseudolikelihood simplifies into (Kalbfleisch and
Lawless, 1988, p. 156; Samuelsen, 1997, p. 383)∑
i∈O
Ei
[
β ′(Xi, Zi)− log
∑
j∈Ri
1
pij
exp{β ′(Xj, Zj)}
]
,
where Ri ⊆ O denotes the risk set at event time Ti. If not specified by
the sampling design, the inclusion probabilities pij are replaced with esti-
mates pˆij . In designs where all cases are selected, pij = 1 if Ei = 1, and
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the cases contribute to the risk sets with unit weights, while the non-cases
assume weights greater or equal to one. Parameter estimation would pro-
ceed by maximizing the pseudolikelihood expression with respect to β, and
possibly using resampling-based variance estimators (see e.g. Barlow, 1994)
for the resulting estimator βˆ, if Gaussian approximation is not thought to be
appropriate.
The connection between the approximative likelihood here and the con-
ditional likelihood (18) derived for a case-cohort design are the first-order
inclusion probabilities. In Bernoulli sampling the actual inclusion probabil-
ities are equivalent to the first-order inclusion probabilities (Sa¨rndal et al.,
1992, p. 32). This suggests that if the inclusion indicators in the sampling
design used are approximately independent, the case-cohort conditional like-
lihood might give a reasonable approximation, with the first order inclusion
probabilities for cases and non-cases substituted in (18).
4.6 Model uncertainty and selection
In addition to missing data, another problem for which the Bayesian ap-
proach provides a seemingly natural solution is model uncertainty, which we
understand broadly to mean the uncertainty on the adequacy of the cho-
sen parametric probability distributions in prediction and explanation tasks.
However, as noted in Section 2.3, the predictive ability of a model is much
easier to evaluate than its ability to explain the unobserved parts of reality
we are interested in. While the Bayes’ formula (2) is commonly applied in the
setting of one fixed parametric probability model, it may as well be applied in
the context of a (countable) set of alternative models (possibly corresponding
to competing hypotheses or theories) M = {h1, h2, . . .}, as (Sisson, 2005, p.
1077)
PH|Y (H = hk | Y = y) =
PY |H(Y ∈ dy | H = hk)PH(H = hk)∑|M |
l=1 PY |H(Y ∈ dy | H = hl)PH(H = hl)
, (20)
where H : Ω → M is a discrete random variable; the associated proba-
bility statements are to be understood as the uncertainty about the “true”
model (the concept of which is further discussed below). Here the left hand
side is known as the posterior model probability. Because the denominator
is a constant, if the alternative models are given equal prior probabilities
PH(H = hk) = 1/|M |, the model with the highest posterior probability is
given by argmaxk PY |H(Y ∈ dy | H = hk), which is the model selection
criterion already discussed in Section 2.3. The probability here was referred
to as the marginal probability of the data because it is given by integration
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over the parametrization of the model as
PY |H(Y ∈ dy | H = hk) =
∫
θk∈R
pk
PY |Θk(Y | Θk = θk)PΘk(Θk ∈ dθk), (21)
where Θk : Ω→ R
pk is a parameter vector specific to the model hk. A rough
approximation for this quantity is the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC,
Schwarz, 1978; see also Raftery, 1995, p. 130-133). Here it is important to
note that the parameter vectors associated with the alternative models may
be of a different dimension. It is not necessary that the models are nested,
though in practical problems this is often the case. A typical example is
variable selection where the space of alternative models may be represented
as M = {0, 1}p, where p is the total number of possible covariates and each
binary indicator corresponds to exclusion/inclusion of the covariate in the
model. As the total number of alternative models is then |M | = 2p, the
model space easily gets too large (say, with p = 30, over one billion) for the
evaluation of every model to be feasible in practice, especially as numerical
evaluation of integrals of the type (21) is not straightforward. This is be-
cause direct application of Monte Carlo integration by simulating from the
prior distribution PΘk is very inefficient if the prior involves little information
(Kass and Raftery, 1995, p. 779). Although alternative methods for eval-
uating such integrals have been proposed (see Kass and Raftery, 1995, for
a review), application of Bayesian model selection became fully feasible in
practice only after invention of Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques which
allow simultaneous exploration of both parameter and model spaces (Sisson,
2005). Here the extension by Green (1995) to the Metropolis-Hastings algo-
rithm (see Section 3.1) was central. Reviews of the methods in the context
of variable selection are provided by Dellaportas et al. (2002) and O’Hara
and Sillanpa¨a¨ (2009).
Denoting the concatenated random vector of all parameters as Θ =
(Θ1, . . . ,Θ|M |) : Ω → R
p1+...+p|M|, the aim in simultaneous inference on the
model and parameter spaces is to produce random samples from the posterior
distribution PΘ,H|Y (Θ ∈ dθ,H = hk | Y = y). With such a sample available,
if the posterior probabilities for specific models are of interest, they can be
easily obtained by the integration
PH|Y (H = hk | Y = y) =
∫
θ∈R
p1+...+p|M|
PΘ,H|Y (Θ ∈ dθ,H = hk | Y = y).
If some parameters, say Φ, are common to all models, posterior inference on
these parameters may be carried out by integrating out the model specific
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parameters and the model indices themselves as
PΦ|Y (Φ ∈ φ | Y = y) (22)
=
∫
θ∈R
p1+...+p|M|
|M |∑
l=1
PΦ,Θ,H|Y (Φ ∈ dφ,Θ ∈ dθ,H = hl | Y = y).
This approach is known as model averaged inference (see e.g. Burnham and
Anderson, 2004). Yet another, and possibly the most important, generaliza-
tion is to consider the posterior predictive distributions
PYn+1|Y (Yn+1 ∈ dyn+1 | Y = y) (23)
=
∫
θ∈R
p1+...+p|M|
|M |∑
l=1
PYn+1,Θ,H|Y (Yn+1 ∈ dyn+1,Θ ∈ dθ,H = hl | Y = y),
integrated over both the parameter and model spaces (Sisson, 2005, p. 1077).
We can still further generalize the present framework by noting that the
model indicator H need not be a discrete random variable; instead the dis-
tribution PH in (20) can be defined as a general mixing measure, in the
sense of Teicher (1960), for example. Now the distribution PH of the random
variable H : Ω→ M is a probability measure on (M,M) and we have
PH|Y (H ∈ dh | Y = y) =
PY |H(Y ∈ dy | H = h)PH(H ∈ dh)∫
h∈M
PY |H(Y ∈ dy | H = h)PH(H ∈ dh)
,
where the notation dh is to be interpreted as dh ∈ M. It should be noted
that in this general case the space of possible models need not be countable.
One example is the Diriclet process mixture model (see Neal, 2000, for a
review), while in the model devised in Article IV and applied in Article V,
the model space was defined by Poisson point processes (see Section 2.4).
Although in these cases the space of possible models is not countable, the
realizations of H , specifying the dimension of the parameter space of each
model, are finite, so (21) still applies, and a posterior predictive distribution
PYn+1|Y (Yn+1 ∈ dyn+1 | Y = y) may be obtained by integrating over all
realizations of models and the related parameters encountered during a finite
MCMC run. However, in the general case the notion of posterior model
probability (20), attributed to a specific model realization, loses its meaning,
although posterior probabilities may still be attributed to some suitable set
of such realizations.
It is now in order to consider more closely the interpretation of the con-
cept of posterior model probability. Gelman and Rubin (1995) in their com-
mentary to Raftery (1995) questioned the need to do model selection in the
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first place, criticizing especially assigning posterior probabilities to a fixed
set of candidate models. Although the selection criterion based on the max-
imal marginal probability of the data will consistently select the true model
if such a model is included in the set of candidate models, as was already
noted in Section 2.2, we rarely truly believe that any of the candidate models
actually is the true data generating mechanism. Instead, the truth may be
interpreted as equivalent to complete information on the reality itself, a situ-
ation which is mostly unattainable in practice. In any case, had we complete
information available, there might be no need to resort to probability-based
inference in the first place. If the true model is not included in the model
space M , but posterior model probability is nevertheless used to select the
best model, the resulting selection may or may not be meaningful, depend-
ing on the intended application of the model. The resulting selection may
be characterized as the model with the best prequential predictive ability
(Raftery, 1995, p. 777) or, asymptotically with increasing sample size, ap-
proaching from below (in terms of model complexity) the most parsimonious
of the models with minimal Kullback-Leibler information loss with respect
to truth or full reality (Burnham and Anderson, 2004, p. 275-280).
To sum up, posterior probability-based inferences concerning the “true”
model require a priori assumption that such a model is in the model space.
Such an assumption may be more reasonable in situations corresponding to
the classical hypothesis testing, with two competing hypotheses, formulated
so that one or the other is supposed to be correct (see Raftery, 1995, p. 776).
In the general case with multiple alternative models which all are at best ap-
proximations of the truth, one should be careful and not attach the posterior
model probabilities with meanings they do not in reality possess. This, how-
ever, does not change the fact that model uncertainty is a real problem. In
any case, selection of a single best model may tend to hide this problem.
Especially in non-Bayesian statistics, the selection of a single, in some sense
optimal, model is often followed by inferences entirely in the setting of that
model, as if any other candidate models had never existed (Draper, 1995, p.
45-46). For these reasons, instead of model selection, we prefer to utilize the
methods reviewed in the present section in situations where we want to relax
possibly too rigid parametric assumptions, by specifying the model through
random functions, instead of confining ourselves to a single parametric dis-
tribution. The inference then utilizes model averaged posterior distributions
of the form (22) or posterior predictive distributions (23), integrated over
the model space. In such distributions the uncertainty involved in the model
specification is appropriately quantified.
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4.7 Causality and potential outcomes
Previously we have discussed inference based on posterior distributions for
parameters and posterior predictive distributions, and also explanatory and
predictive modeling. It should be emphasized that the use of posterior pre-
dictive distributions is not limited only to prediction task, but that they are
also important tools in explanatory analysis. As an example we discuss here
utilization of posterior predictive distributions in causal inference. Although
the role of the randomized experimental study design is often emphasized
in the discussion of statistical inference on causal effects (see, for example,
Rubin, 1978, and Holland, 1986), observational studies are also carried out
in hope to learn something about causal relationships; such studies would
not be funded to find and report mere statistical associations without the
belief that there may be something real at work behind them. Moreover, in
many situations an experimental study is not a feasible option due to ethi-
cal or practical reasons. Therefore, the question of causal inference is by no
means limited to randomized designs. It is also too wide of an area to deal
with herein; we refer to Pearl (2009) and concentrate here on one simpli-
fied example, broadly following the principles outlined by Arjas and Parner
(2004).
Consider an experimental (but not necessarily randomized) study in-
volving the individuals C = {1, . . . , n}. Let XC = {Xi : i ∈ C} be a
collection of pre-treatment covariates measured on the n individuals, and
AC = {Ai : i ∈ C}, Ai ∈ {0, 1}, a vector of indicators telling whether each
individual received placebo or active treatment/intervention. Further, let
YC = {Yi : i ∈ C} be response variables, measured after a sufficient time
interval after application of the treatments. The joint probability distribu-
tion of the observed data at the end of the study period can be factored
representing the order of the data collection as
P (AC, XC , YC) = P (YC | AC , XC)P (AC | XC)P (XC).
Because the treatments, in addition to taking into account the individual co-
variate values Xi, may be administered according to some pre-defined quota,
it does not seem reasonable to assume full exchangeability over the unit
indices of the triples (Ai, Xi, Yi). However, it may be justified to assume ex-
changeability (over unit indices) of the responses Yi, given the covariates Xi
and the treatment Ai. This postulate is known as conditional exchangeabil-
ity (see Lindley and Novick, 1981, p. 47). It should be noted that the weaker
condition of conditional exchangeability follows from full exchangeability but
not vice versa. If we further assume that treatments given to other individu-
als do not affect the outcome of a given individual (“no interference between
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treatments”; this assumption would not be realistic in vaccination trials, for
instance), we get
P (YC | AC , XC) =
∫
θ
[
n∏
i=1
P (Yi | AC , XC , θ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ)
Yi⊥(AC\{i},XC\{i})|(Ai,Xi,Θ)
=
∫
θ
[
n∏
i=1
P (Yi | Ai, Xi, θ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ).
In addition, it is assumed that that the treatment assignment is carried out
according to a known rule which may depend only on the (then observed)
covariates XC , and P (AC | XC) is therefore uninformative on the parame-
ters Θ. This situation is fully analogous to the unconfounded and ignorable
sampling mechanisms discussed in Section 4.3. Inferences on the parameters
Θ may now be based on the posterior
P (Θ ∈ dθ | AC , XC , YC)
θ
∝
[
n∏
i=1
P (Yi | Ai, Xi, θ)
]
P (Θ ∈ dθ), (24)
and causal inferences will be based on the comparison between two posterior
predictive distributions concerning a generic individual indexed as n + 1,
namely the predictive distribution of the response given no treatment
P (Yn+1 | An+1 = 0, Xn+1, AC , XC , YC)
=
∫
θ
P (Yn+1 | An+1 = 0, Xn+1, θ)P (Θ ∈ dθ | AC , XC , YC)
and the predictive distribution of the response given the treatment
P (Yn+1 | An+1 = 1, Xn+1, AC , XC , YC)
=
∫
θ
P (Yn+1 | An+1 = 1, Xn+1, θ)P (Θ ∈ dθ | AC , XC, YC).
For instance, we might be concerned with the expected treatment effect
E(Yn+1 | An+1 = 1, Xn+1, AC , XC, YC)
− E(Yn+1 | An+1 = 0, Xn+1, AC , XC , YC),
which is easily obtained if an MCMC sample is available from both predictive
distributions. It is notable that the predictive approach to causal inference
entirely avoids the need to introduce the somewhat controversial counterfac-
tual notation (see Dawid, 2000), and the related random variables. Indeed,
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the unobservability of counterfactuals is named as the fundamental problem
of causal inference by Holland (1986, p. 947), implying that causal infer-
ence is impossible. The statistical solution noted by Holland is to consider
averaged population level causal effects instead of individual level causal ef-
fects. This can be naturally formulated in terms of exchangeability; the
very spirit of the exchangeability postulate is that we can make probability
statements concerning a further generic unit, while the tool to make such
statements is the posterior predictive distribution. The potential outcomes
considered herein simply correspond to two different conditional probability
distributions, which are obtained using the same exchangeability and condi-
tional independence assumptions that were applied in deriving the likelihood
expression for the observed data.
The above situation was straightforward because the treatment assign-
ment could be chosen at will, in which case it should be easy to make sure
that no confounding occurs, as long as the relevant covariates are appropri-
ately taken into account in the analysis. The same probabilistic framework
can be applied also in purely observational studies, but then further assump-
tions are needed as the treatment assignment will be outside the control of
the researcher, with a possibly unknown mechanism. To illustrate this, we
introduce a new set of variables UC = {Ui : i ∈ C}, representing all the fac-
tors which are unobserved in the study but may have potentially contributed
to the treatment assignment. The joint distribution may now be factored as
P (UC , AC , XC , YC) = P (YC | AC , XC , UC)P (AC | XC , UC)P (XC | UC)P (UC).
It is now obvious that if these unobserved factors may have an effect on both
the treatment assignments AC and the responses YC , inferences based on the
marginal posterior distribution (24) obtained above will not tell about the
true causal effects of the treatment. The inferences will be valid only if either
one of the further conditional independence assumptions YC ⊥ UC | AC , XC
and AC ⊥ UC | XC holds true. The latter corresponds to “no unmeasured
confounders” (see Robins, 1997), and means assuming that the treatment
assignments have been based only on information which is available also in
the observational study. The latter assumption seems more reasonable in
practice than the former, since it is at least verifiable to a degree, if more
information is obtained on the assignment mechanism. If we are confident
that enough covariates have been obtained to assume no unmeasured con-
founders, the inferences can proceed utilizing the same posterior distribution
(24) and the predictive distributions as in the experimental situation (see
Arjas and Parner, 2004, p. 175-176). The probabilistic framework outlined
here was applied in the context of optimal sequential treatment regimes in
Article V.
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5 Discussion
Even complex cohort sampling designs can be easily handled by using the full
likelihood approach. It is needed that the sampling design satisfies a miss-
ing at random type assumption, which seems to apply to most of the com-
monly used cohort sampling designs, including quota sampling and counter-
matching. In addition, an exchangeability postulate extending for infinite
sequences is needed; the sensibility of this depends on the parameters of in-
terest. If it seems reasonable to generalize the results from observed data
to a further generic unit, the postulate may be justified. In practice full
likelihood inference involves an integration over the unobserved elements of
the variables collected in the second phase sampling. Such integration is
conveniently handled by using Bayesian data augmentation. Alternatives
are the EM-algorithm or direct maximization of the numerically integrated
observed data likelihood. However, the full likelihood approach is available
only when an enumerable study base exists. This is commonly not the case
in retrospective case-control studies.
Conditioning on the rule which produced the realized second phase sam-
ple will also result in a plausible likelihood expression. Here the likelihood
is written over the fully observed subset instead of the full cohort. The con-
ditioning will in many cases lose information compared to a corresponding
full likelihood which utilizes all observed data. However, conditioning may
be necessary when the study base is very large, making the required integra-
tion impractical, or when an enumerable study base is not available. Left
truncation in cross-sectional cohort recruitment is an example of the latter
situation. Conditional likelihood involves a correction term which will gen-
erally depend on the parameters of interest and on the sampling mechanism
used.
We have seen that the inference problems in the five articles included
in this work can be covered under a general probabilistic framework, with
maximum likelihood estimation interpreted as a special case or approxima-
tion. However, the fully probabilistic Bayesian approach can handle many
situations for which likelihood by itself would be inadequate. Examples cov-
ered here include utilizing hierarchical parametrization in more flexible model
definition and posterior predictive distributions in causal inference.
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